Chapter 11. CIVIL PRACTICE ACT  

CROSS REFERENCES. --Citation of chapter as "Georgia Civil Practice Act," § 9-11-85. Procedure in magistrate courts, § 15-10-40 et seq. Practice and procedure in garnishment proceedings, Ch. 4, T. 18. Authority to enact local rules, Uniform Superior Court Rules, Rule 1.2. Motions for summary judgment, Uniform Superior Court Rules, Rule 6.5.
 
EDITOR'S NOTES. --The short title for this chapter (the "Georgia Civil Practice Act") is provided for in § 9-11-85 rather than in the first section of this chapter, where the short title for a chapter of the Code is normally provided for. This results from the fact that the renumbering of sections of this chapter follows the numbering scheme of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rather than the usual scheme observed elsewhere in the Code.
 
LAW REVIEWS. --For article advocating the adoption of the federal rules of civil procedure in Georgia, see 18 Ga. B.J. 297 (1956). For article discussing rule-making power and advocating Supreme Court of Georgia be vested with rule-making power over both civil and criminal procedure, see 23 Ga. B.J. 303 (1961). For article comparing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to Georgia trial practice procedures prior to the adoption of the Georgia Civil Practice Act, see 1 Ga. St. B.J. 315 (1965). For article, "The Georgia Civil Practice Act of 1966: Preliminary Observations," see 2 Ga. St. B.J. 419 (1966). For article comparing sections of the Georgia Civil Practice Act with preexisting provisions of the Georgia Code, see 3 Ga. St. B.J. 295 (1967). For article, "The 1967 Amendments to the Georgia Civil Practice Act and the Appellate Procedure Act," see 3 Ga. St. B.J. 383 (1967). For article discussing counterclaims and cross-claims under the Georgia Civil Practice Act, see 4 Ga. St. B.J. 205 (1967). For article, "Synopses of 1968 Amendments Appellate Procedure Act and Georgia Civil Practice Act," see 4 Ga. St. B.J. 503 (1968). For article discussing liability of corporate directors, officers, and shareholders under the Georgia Business Corporation Code, and as affected by provisions of the Georgia Civil Practice Act, see 7 Ga. St. B.J. 277 (1971). For article discussing 1976 to 1977 developments in Georgia's practice and procedure, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 265 (1977). For article surveying Georgia cases in the area of trial practice and procedure from June 1977 through May 1978, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 239 (1978). For article surveying judicial developments in Georgia's trial practice and procedure laws, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 249 (1979). For survey article on trial practice and procedure, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 299 (1982). For annual survey of law on trial practice and procedure, see 35 Mercer L. Rev. 315 (1983). For article surveying 1983 Eleventh Circuit cases on trial practice and procedure, see 35 Mercer L. Rev. 1295 (1984). For annual survey on trial practice and procedure, see 36 Mercer L. Rev. 347 (1984). For article, "Defending the Lawsuit: A First-Round Checklist," see 22 Ga. St. B.J. 24 (1985). For annual survey of trial practice and procedure, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 383 (1986). For article, "On with the Old!," see 24 Ga. St. B.J. 13 (1987). For annual survey on trial practice and procedure, see 43 Mercer L. Rev. 441 (1991). For annual survey on trial practice and procedure, see 44 Mercer L. Rev. 421 (1992). For annual survey article on trial practice and procedure, see 49 Mercer L. Rev. 313 (1997). For annual survey article on trial practice and procedure, see 50 Mercer L. Rev. 359 (1998). For annual survey article discussing trial practice and procedure, see 51 Mercer L. Rev. 487 (1999). For annual survey article discussing trial practice and procedure, see 52 Mercer L. Rev. 447 (2000). For article, "Trial Practice and Procedure," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 475 (2001). For article, "Georgia's New Evidence Code: After the Celebration, a Serious Review of Anticipated Subjects of Litigation to be Brought on by the New Legislation," see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (2012).
   For note, "Default Judgments Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Georgia Civil Practice Act," see 7 Ga. St. B.J. 385 (1971). For note analyzing the Civil Procedure Act of 1966, and its application from 1966 to 1976, see 11 Ga. L. Rev. 546 (1977). For note, "Venue in Multidefendant Civil Practice in Georgia," see 6 Ga. State U.L. Rev. 427 (1990). For survey of 1995 Eleventh Circuit cases on trial practice and procedure, see 47 Mercer L. Rev. 907 (1996). For review of 1996 civil practice legislation, see 13 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 23.
 
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
 
CONSTRUCTION OF CHAPTER. --This chapter should be liberally construed and applied. Ambler v. Archer, 230 Ga. 281, 196 S.E.2d 858 (1973) (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9).
   This chapter is in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed and followed. Tahoe Carpet Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 153 Ga. App. 317, 265 S.E.2d 116 (1980) (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9).
 
PURPOSE. --This chapter is intended to be a revolutionary and sweeping revision of Georgia legal procedure. Old Hickory Prods. Co. v. Hickory Specialties, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9).
 
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THIS CHAPTER WAS TO COMPREHENSIVELY AND EXHAUSTIVELY REVISE, supersede, and modernize pretrial, trial and, certain post-trial procedures in civil cases. Bradberry v. Bradberry, 232 Ga. 651, 208 S.E.2d 469 (1974) (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9).
 
A PARAMOUNT PURPOSE OF THIS CHAPTER IS TO SIMPLIFY PROCEDURE in civil cases. Morgan v. Reeves, 226 Ga. 697, 177 S.E.2d 68 (1970) (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9).
 
PROMOTION OF JUSTICE INTENDED. --Rules set forth in this chapter are intended to promote and not to obstruct the administration of justice and thus enable the court to do substantial justice rather than to decide cases upon technicalities with no relationship to the rights of the parties to litigation. Mundt v. Olson, 155 Ga. App. 145, 270 S.E.2d 344 (1980) (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9).
 
DECISIONS ON THE MERITS PROMOTED. --This chapter is designed to simplify civil procedure by deemphasizing form and technicality in order that substantive rights of litigants may be asserted and tried on merits. Ambler v. Archer, 230 Ga. 281, 196 S.E.2d 858 (1973) (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9).
   This chapter should serve to reduce number of decisions resolved on grounds with no relation to merits of litigation. Ambler v. Archer, 230 Ga. 281, 196 S.E.2d 858 (1973) (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9).
 
TECHNICALITIES MINIMIZED. --One of the purposes of this chapter was to minimize situations in which actions abated on account of niceties of technical rules of practice and procedure. Tyree v. Jackson, 226 Ga. 690, 177 S.E.2d 160 (1970) (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9).
   The people's right to litigate with governmental bodies should not be decided on technicalities any more than one citizen's right to litigate with another citizen. City of Atlanta v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness of Atlanta, Inc., 240 Ga. 96, 239 S.E.2d 515 (1977).
 
NOTICE PLEADING SUBSTITUTED FOR ISSUE PLEADING. --Basic premise of this chapter is that it does away with "issue pleading" and substitutes "notice pleading." Byrd v. Ford Motor Co., 118 Ga. App. 333, 163 S.E.2d 327 (1968); General Tel. Co. v. Pritchett, 119 Ga. App. 53, 165 S.E.2d 918 (1969) (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9).
   New rules under this chapter restrict pleadings to task of general notice-giving, and invest the depositions and discovery process with a vital role in preparation for trial. Byrd v. Ford Motor Co., 118 Ga. App. 333, 163 S.E.2d 327 (1968) (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9).
   O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9 abolished "issue pleading," substituted in lieu thereof "notice pleading," and directs that all pleadings shall be construed as to do substantial justice. Sheppard v. Yara Eng'g Corp., 248 Ga. 147, 281 S.E.2d 586 (1981).
   Under the spirit and intent of the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9, "notice pleading" has been substituted for "issue pleading." Mills v. Bing, 181 Ga. App. 475, 352 S.E.2d 798 (1987).
 
NOTICE PLEADING REQUIREMENTS. --Under notice pleading procedure of the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9, only a short and plain statement of the claim is required; nevertheless, a complaint must give a defendant notice of the claim in terms sufficiently clear to enable the defendant to frame a responsive pleading thereto. Allen v. Bergman, 201 Ga. App. 781, 412 S.E.2d 549 (1991).
 
PURPOSE OF NOTICE PLEADING. --Objective in adopting the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9, and rejecting "issue" pleading was to avoid dismissal on technicalities and to give parties fair notice of claims and/or defenses to be asserted against them; the discovery process was to be used to fill in details. The substance or function of a pleading, rather than its name, should determine its nature. Edelschick v. Blanchard, 177 Ga. App. 410, 339 S.E.2d 628 (1985).
 
WORD "HEARING," as contained in this chapter, is limited in its context to court hearings on motions. Knowles v. Knowles, 125 Ga. App. 642, 188 S.E.2d 800 (1972); Montgomery v. USS Agri-Chemical Div., 155 Ga. App. 189, 270 S.E.2d 362 (1980) (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9).
 
SPECIAL PLEA OF MISTAKEN IDENTITY NOT REQUIRED. --This chapter does not require that a party must specially plead or raise by motion the defense that plaintiff sued the wrong person (in this case, individuals rather than corporation). Calhoun v. Herrin, 125 Ga. App. 518, 188 S.E.2d 273 (1972) (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9).
 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS. --The Declaratory Judgment Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 4, T. 9, is governed by the practice rules contained in the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9. Town of Thunderbolt v. River Crossing Apts., Ltd., 189 Ga. App. 607, 377 S.E.2d 12 (1988).
   Since Declaratory Judgment Act (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 4, T. 9) contains no special provisions for pleading, test of what is needed to withstand motion to dismiss petition for declaratory judgment is determined under the Civil Practice Act (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9). Southeastern Fid. Fire Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 118 Ga. App. 861, 165 S.E.2d 887 (1968).
   The Civil Practice Act (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9) is applicable to actions seeking declaratory judgment, and test of what is needed to withstand motion to dismiss petition for declaratory judgment is determined under that Act. Rockdale County v. City of Conyers, 231 Ga. 477, 202 S.E.2d 436 (1973).
 
SUIT ON CONTRACT THAT ONLY LICENSED PERSON CAN ENTER. --The Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9, does not require a person suing on a contract permitted to be entered into only by licensed persons to plead the existence of such a license in order to state a claim, but, at whatever stage of the proceedings it appears that the plaintiff is seeking to recover upon a contract permitted to be entered into only by persons holding licenses issued as a regulatory measure, it becomes imperative for the plaintiff to prove that plaintiff holds such a license and held such a license at the time the contract was entered into in order to authorize a recovery. Myers v. Wynn, 201 Ga. App. 764, 412 S.E.2d 581 (1991).
 
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT IS TRIED UNDER RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, rather than under rules of criminal procedure, and preponderance of evidence is sufficient to convict defendant. Hill v. Bartlett, 124 Ga. App. 56, 183 S.E.2d 80 (1971). But see In re Crane, 253 Ga. 667, 324 S.E.2d 443 (1985).
 
APPLICABILITY TO JUVENILE COURTS. --The Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9, does not apply to juvenile courts. In re N.N.G, 196 Ga. App. 765, 397 S.E.2d 40 (1990).
 
CLAIM FOR INDEBTEDNESS. --While creditor may bring separate actions to foreclose a security interest and on an indebtedness, and both remedies may be sought in same action, claim for indebtedness, whether filed in a separate action or in same action as foreclosure proceeding under former Code 1933, § 67-701 (see O.C.G.A. § 44-14-230 et seq.), must stand or fall upon the principles set forth in the Civil Practice Act (O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9), including, but not limited to, process and service of process, and may not be "piggy-backed" into court using special rules applicable to foreclosure actions under former Code 1933, § 67-701 (see O.C.G.A. § 44-14-230 et seq.). Porter v. Midland-Guardian Co., 242 Ga. 1, 247 S.E.2d 743 (1978).
 
OTHER STATUTORY TIME PERIODS CONTROL. --The provisions of the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9, which deal with time frames do not apply to periods of time which are definitely fixed by other statutes, such as O.C.G.A. § 32-3-14. Bates & Assocs. v. Department of Transp., 186 Ga. App. 828, 368 S.E.2d 544, cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 917, 368 S.E.2d 544 (1988).
 
ACT CREATING MUNICIPAL COURT REPEALED. --Adoption of this chapter had effect of repealing provisions of Ga. L. 1952, p. 2184 et seq., the Act creating Municipal Court of Columbus, which are contrary to its provisions. Lee v. G.A.C. Fin. Corp., 130 Ga. App. 44, 202 S.E.2d 221 (1973) (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9).
 
WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL. --Passage of this chapter did not change time-honored rule of law that where party has right to demand a jury trial and fails to do so, the party may be held to have waived it. Marler v. Citizens & S. Bank, 139 Ga. App. 851, 229 S.E.2d 786 (1976), aff'd, 239 Ga. 342, 236 S.E.2d 590 (1977) (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9).
 
EQUITABLE COMPLAINT IN APPEAL FROM PROBATE COURT NOT MAINTAINABLE. --Nothing in this chapter can be construed as authorizing superior court to entertain complaint in equity in case on appeal from probate court, as on appeal jurisdiction of superior court is no greater than that of probate court. Logan v. Nunnelly, 230 Ga. 588, 198 S.E.2d 321 (1973) (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9).
 
PARTY DISMISSED ONLY WHERE NO SET OF FACTS SUPPORTS CLAIM. --A party should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim against such party, unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of plaintiff's claim which would entitle the plaintiff to relief against that party. Sheppard v. Yara Eng'g Corp., 248 Ga. 147, 281 S.E.2d 586 (1981).
 
CITED in Willis v. Byrd, 116 Ga. App. 555, 158 S.E.2d 458 (1967); Peacock Constr. Co. v. Turner Concrete, Inc., 116 Ga. App. 822, 159 S.E.2d 114 (1967); Townsend & Ghegan Enters. v. W.R. Bean & Son, 117 Ga. App. 109, 159 S.E.2d 776 (1968); Crosby v. Crosby, 224 Ga. 109, 160 S.E.2d 362 (1968); Algernon Blair, Inc. v. Trust Co., 224 Ga. 118, 160 S.E.2d 395 (1968); Republic Mtg. Corp. v. Beasley, 117 Ga. App. 303, 160 S.E.2d 429 (1968); Lloyd Indus., Inc. v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 117 Ga. App. 328, 160 S.E.2d 433 (1968); Hill v. Willis, 224 Ga. 263, 161 S.E.2d 281 (1968); Funderburg v. Wold, 117 Ga. App. 638, 161 S.E.2d 376 (1968); Clark v. Perrin, 224 Ga. 307, 161 S.E.2d 874 (1968); Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Hawkins, 117 Ga. App. 797, 161 S.E.2d 886 (1968); Cail v. Griffin, 224 Ga. 431, 162 S.E.2d 356 (1968); Cook v. Barfield, 224 Ga. 355, 162 S.E.2d 417 (1968); B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Callaway, 224 Ga. 367, 162 S.E.2d 430 (1968); Watkins v. Coastal States Life Ins. Co., 118 Ga. App. 145, 162 S.E.2d 788 (1968); Banks v. Champion, 118 Ga. App. 79, 162 S.E.2d 824 (1968); Zappa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 118 Ga. App. 235, 162 S.E.2d 911 (1968); O'Neil v. Moore, 118 Ga. App. 424, 164 S.E.2d 328 (1968); Woodall v. First Nat'l Bank, 118 Ga. App. 440, 164 S.E.2d 361 (1968); Pritchard v. State, 224 Ga. 776, 164 S.E.2d 808 (1968); Morris v. Townsend, 118 Ga. App. 572, 164 S.E.2d 869 (1968); Lovett v. Lovett, 225 Ga. 251, 167 S.E.2d 590 (1969); Cohen v. Garland, 119 Ga. App. 333, 167 S.E.2d 599 (1969); Todd v. Waddell, 120 Ga. App. 20, 169 S.E.2d 351 (1969); Bragg v. Bragg, 225 Ga. 494, 170 S.E.2d 29 (1969); Foster v. Lankford, 120 Ga. App. 573, 171 S.E.2d 662 (1969); Doe v. Moss, 120 Ga. App. 762, 172 S.E.2d 321 (1969); Fender v. Fender, 226 Ga. 129, 173 S.E.2d 211 (1970); Siefferman v. Kirkpatrick, 121 Ga. App. 161, 173 S.E.2d 262 (1970); Fendley v. Weaver, 121 Ga. App. 526, 174 S.E.2d 369 (1970); McKinnon v. Neugent, 226 Ga. 331, 174 S.E.2d 788 (1970); Steelman v. Associates Disct. Corp., 121 Ga. App. 649, 175 S.E.2d 62 (1970); Tankersley v. Security Nat'l Corp., 122 Ga. App. 129, 176 S.E.2d 274 (1970); Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Clark, 122 Ga. App. 237, 176 S.E.2d 596 (1970); Martin v. Prior Tire Co., 122 Ga. App. 637, 178 S.E.2d 306 (1970); Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Berryman, 123 Ga. App. 71, 179 S.E.2d 646 (1970); Pichulik v. Air Conditioning & Heating Serv. Co., 123 Ga. App. 195, 180 S.E.2d 286 (1971); Stevens v. Stevens, 227 Ga. 410, 181 S.E.2d 34 (1971); Hill v. Small, 228 Ga. 31, 183 S.E.2d 752 (1971); Roberts v. Artistic Ornamental Iron Co., 124 Ga. App. 744, 186 S.E.2d 143 (1971); Buffington v. McClelland, 125 Ga. App. 153, 186 S.E.2d 550 (1971); Payne v. Shelnutt, 126 Ga. App. 598, 191 S.E.2d 487 (1972); Gregory v. King Plumbing, Inc., 127 Ga. App. 512, 194 S.E.2d 271 (1972); Williams v. Nuckolls, 230 Ga. 697, 198 S.E.2d 870 (1973); Boyer v. King, 129 Ga. App. 690, 200 S.E.2d 906 (1973); Logan v. Nunnelly, 130 Ga. App. 33, 202 S.E.2d 220 (1973); Continental Ins. Co. v. Mercer, 130 Ga. App. 339, 203 S.E.2d 297 (1973); DeKalb County v. McFarland, 231 Ga. 649, 203 S.E.2d 495 (1974); Fulton County v. Corporation of Presiding Bishop, 133 Ga. App. 847, 212 S.E.2d 451 (1975); Goolsby v. Allstate Ins. Co., 133 Ga. App. 781, 213 S.E.2d 42 (1975); Hodges Appliance Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 133 Ga. App. 936, 213 S.E.2d 46 (1975); Wiley v. Georgia Power Co., 134 Ga. App. 187, 213 S.E.2d 550 (1975); Burston v. Caldwell, 506 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1975); Thomas v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 139 Ga. App. 40, 227 S.E.2d 870 (1976); Bowen v. State, 144 Ga. App. 329, 241 S.E.2d 431 (1977); Buchan v. Duke, 153 Ga. App. 310, 265 S.E.2d 308 (1980); Weems v. McCloud, 619 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1980); Bowers v. Continental Ins. Co., 753 F.2d 1574 (11th Cir. 1985).
 
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE OF CASE LAW CONSTRUING FORMER ACTIONS. --While provisions which have been repealed specifically by the Act which enacted this chapter have been rendered void and are generally no longer effective, cases construing such former sections are of precedential value in construing the same or similar provisions found elsewhere in the Code. Bowen v. State, 239 Ga. 517, 238 S.E.2d 62 (1977) (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9).
 
USE OF FEDERAL CASE LAW IN CONSTRUING CHAPTER. --Since this chapter is modeled and predicated on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal cases, while not binding precedent, will be considered as persuasive authority in construing pertinent provisions. Poole v. City of Atlanta, 117 Ga. App. 432, 160 S.E.2d 874 (1968) (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9).
   As this chapter is substantially identical to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is appropriate to resort to federal cases for its construction. Harper v. DeFreitas, 117 Ga. App. 236, 160 S.E.2d 260 (1968).
   Because of the similarity between O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is proper that the court give consideration and great weight to constructions placed on the Federal Rules by the federal courts. Bicknell v. CBT Factors Corp., 171 Ga. App. 897, 321 S.E.2d 383 (1984).
   
 
REMEDIAL STATUTES ARE NOT INOPERATIVE, ALTHOUGH OF A RETROSPECTIVE NATURE, provided they do not impair contracts, and only go to confirm rights already existing, in furtherance of the remedy, by curing defects and adding to means of enforcing existing obligations. Berry v. Siskin, 128 Ga. App. 3, 195 S.E.2d 255 (1973).
 
LAW WHICH MERELY ALTERS PROCEDURE MAY BE MADE APPLICABLE TO PAST TRANSACTIONS. Berry v. Siskin, 128 Ga. App. 3, 195 S.E.2d 255 (1973).
 
NO PERSON HAS A VESTED RIGHT IN ANY COURSE OF PROCEDURE, nor in the power of delaying justice, nor of deriving benefit from technical and formal matters of pleading. Berry v. Siskin, 128 Ga. App. 3, 195 S.E.2d 255 (1973).
 
EFFECT OF SIMULTANEOUS REPEAL AND REENACTMENT of automatic dismissal provisions. Berry v. Siskin, 128 Ga. App. 3, 195 S.E.2d 255 (1973).
   
 
CHAPTER CONTROLS OVER APPELLATE PRACTICE ACT. --The Civil Practice Act (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9), being the latest expression of legislative will, must control over provisions of the Appellate Practice Act, (see O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 6, T. 5), if conflict exists. Howard v. Smith, 226 Ga. 850, 178 S.E.2d 159 (1970).
 
APPLICATION OF CHAPTER ON APPEAL. --This chapter may be applied on appeal in reviewing judgment of trial court rendered under former procedure in cases filed prior to chapter's effective date. Bazemore v. Burnet, 117 Ga. App. 849, 161 S.E.2d 924 (1968) (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9).
   Regardless of when judgment was entered below, appellate court must apply the new rules of this chapter. Grubbs v. Duskin, 118 Ga. App. 82, 162 S.E.2d 762 (1968) (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9).
   In reviewing enumeration of errors, appellate court must apply new rules of this chapter regardless of when judgment was entered below. Ghitter v. Edge, 118 Ga. App. 750, 165 S.E.2d 598 (1968) (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9).
   Court of appeals must apply this chapter as it exists at time of its judgment rather than law prevailing at rendition of judgment under review. Turner v. Bank of Zebulon, 128 Ga. App. 404, 196 S.E.2d 668 (1973) (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9).