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GEORGIA CODE (Last Updated: August 20, 2013) |
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Title 40. MOTOR VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC |
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Chapter 3. CERTIFICATES OF TITLE, SECURITY INTERESTS, AND LIENS |
| Article 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS |
| Article 2. CERTIFICATES OF TITLE |
| Article 3. SECURITY INTERESTS IN AND LIENS ON MOTOR VEHICLES |
| Article 4. OFFENSES |
REFS & ANNOS
TITLE 40 Chapter 3 NOTE
CROSS REFERENCES. --Applicability of filing requirements of Uniform Commercial Code, § 11-9-310. Liens upon motor vehicles for failure to pay overweight assessment citation, § 32-6-27. Lien against improperly parked motor vehicle for expenses of removal and storage thereof, § 44-1-13.
CODE COMMISSION NOTES. --Since the purpose of Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, was to "revise, reorganize, modernize, consolidate, and clarify" laws relating to certain aspects of the motor vehicle code, wherever it was possible to do so, other Acts amending Title 40 were construed in conjunction with Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048. This construction particularly includes Acts amending a given Code section when the Code section was later renumbered or redesignated by Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048.
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND REGULATIONS. --Certificate of title applications, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Department of Driver Services, Chapter 375-2-12.
Scrapped vehicles, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division, Chapter 560-10-13.
LAW REVIEWS. --For article on choice-of-law of contracts in Georgia, see 21 Mercer L. Rev. 389 (1970). For article surveying Georgia cases dealing with commercial law from June 1977 through May 1978, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 15 (1978). For article surveying recent legislative and judicial developments regarding Georgia's insurance laws, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 117 (1979).
For note discussing the "Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act" and its impact, see 13 Mercer L. Rev. 258 (1961).
For comment on Maley v. National Acceptance Co., 250 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Ga. 1966), see 3 Ga. St. B.J. 248 (1966).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
COMMERCIAL LAW AND MOTOR VEHICLE PROVISIONS CONSTRUED IN PARI MATERIA. --Georgia Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act (see O.C.G.A. § 40-3-1 et seq.) and the Uniform Commercial Code (see O.C.G.A. T. 11) were adopted at the same session of the General Assembly, relate in part to the same subject matter, and must be construed in pari materia. GMAC v. Whisnant, 387 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1968).
PURPOSE OF CHAPTER. --Manifest purpose of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act (see O.C.G.A. § 40-3-1 et seq.) is to provide a comprehensive system, with few specific exceptions, for the central recordation of ownership, security interests, and liens in all motor vehicles registered and regularly in use in this state. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Smithloff, 119 Ga. App. 284, 167 S.E.2d 190 (1969).
Two of the more important purposes of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act (see O.C.G.A. § 40-3-1 et seq.) are: (1) to prevent traffic in stolen cars by providing an exclusive means of transfer which is recorded in a central location and can be verified quickly and easily; and (2) to provide a means for purchasers of automobiles to ascertain the entire interest of the seller by referring to the face of a single instrument. Flatau v. Bank of Banks County (In re Stewart), 9 Bankr. 32 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1980).
STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF CHAPTER. --Georgia Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act (see O.C.G.A. § 40-3-1 et seq.) must be strictly construed and enforced, especially in those instances where third party interests are involved. Flatau v. Bank of Banks County (In re Stewart), 9 Bankr. 32 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1980).
EFFECT ON EXISTING CASE LAW ON PROVING CHATTEL OWNERSHIP. --Georgia Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act (see O.C.G.A. § 40-3-1 et seq.) provided a simple statutory method of proving the ownership to motor vehicles, but it was not exclusive. It did not change the existing case law as to the manner in which ownership of chattels, including automobiles, could be proven. Hightower v. Berlin, 129 Ga. App. 246, 199 S.E.2d 335 (1973); Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Jenkins, 173 Ga. App. 775, 328 S.E.2d 399 (1985); GECC v. Catalina Homes, Inc., 178 Ga. App. 319, 342 S.E.2d 734 (1986).
APPLICABILITY OF GENERAL RULE ON PERSONAL PROPERTY. --With respect to automobiles not covered by the Georgia Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act (see O.C.G.A. § 40-3-1 et seq.), the rule applicable to personal property in general, that possession thereof constituted presumptive evidence of ownership, was applicable to automobiles. Wreyford v. Peoples Loan & Fin. Corp., 111 Ga. App. 221, 141 S.E.2d 216 (1965).
PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS. --Even though the provisions of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act (see O.C.G.A. § 40-3-1 et seq.) may be mandatory in some situations, transactions between the parties themselves are excepted from those provisions. Goger v. King, 17 Bankr. 64 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
PERFECTING OF SECURITY INTEREST IN VEHICLES. --Only way to perfect a security in motor vehicles was by filing under the Georgia Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act (see O.C.G.A. § 40-3-1 et seq.). Staley v. Phelan Fin. Corp., 116 Ga. App. 1, 156 S.E.2d 201 (1967); but see In re Chappell, 224 Bankr. 507 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1998).
When bank financed purchase of car by car-leasing business, the correct avenue for perfecting of the bank's security interest in the car was through the procedure set forth in O.C.G.A. Ch. 3, T. 40 as opposed to filing of the bank's financial statement under procedures established by the U.C.C. United Carolina Bank v. Capital Auto. Co., 163 Ga. App. 796, 294 S.E.2d 661 (1982).
PURPOSE OF PERFECTING SECURITY INTEREST. --Perfection of security interests under the Georgia Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act (see O.C.G.A. § 40-3-1 et seq.) served purpose of giving notice to subsequent creditors. In re Firth, 363 F. Supp. 369 (M.D. Ga. 1973).
LIENHOLDER'S BURDEN IN IDENTIFYING PARTIES TO BE SERVED. --Registration requirements of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act (see O.C.G.A. § 40-3-1 et seq.) minimize lienholder's burden in identifying the necessary parties to be served. Imperial Body Works, Inc. v. Waters, 156 Ga. App. 887, 275 S.E.2d 822 (1981).
WHEN TITLE PASSES UPON CASH SALES AGREEMENT. --When an agreement is made to sell an automobile for cash, and on delivery of the automobile a check is given for the purchase price as between the vendor and the vendee, and in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, the title to the automobile does not pass until the check is presented to and paid by the bank in the usual course of business. Wreyford v. Peoples Loan & Fin. Corp., 111 Ga. App. 221, 141 S.E.2d 216 (1965).
CRITERIA FOR TREATING POSSESSOR AS OWNER. --Mere possession alone by one who is not shown on the face of the certificate of registration issued by the Revenue Commissioner to be the owner, and in the absence of a properly executed assignment and warranty of title, is not sufficient to authorize another dealing with the possessor to treat that person as the owner thereof. Wreyford v. Peoples Loan & Fin. Corp., 111 Ga. App. 221, 141 S.E.2d 216 (1965).
CITED in Guardian Disct. Co. v. Settles, 114 Ga. App. 418, 151 S.E.2d 530 (1966); Johnson v. Dempsey, 117 Ga. App. 722, 161 S.E.2d 889 (1968); Lawrence v. Harding, 225 Ga. 148, 166 S.E.2d 336 (1969); Central Chevrolet, Inc. v. Lawhorn, 120 Ga. App. 650, 171 S.E.2d 774 (1969); Freeman v. Ryder Truck Lines, 244 Ga. 80, 259 S.E.2d 36 (1979); Harris v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Smith), 10 Bankr. 883 (M.D. Ga. 1981).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BUSINESS TRUST. --Georgia law does not permit a certificate of title to be held in the name of a business trust. 1997 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 97-28.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
AM. JUR. 2D. --7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 29 et seq.
C.J.S. --60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 90 et seq.
ALR. --Civil rights and liabilities as affected by failure to comply with regulations as to registration of automobile or motorcycle, or licensing of operator, 61 ALR 1190; 78 ALR 1028; 87 ALR 1469; 111 ALR 1258; 163 ALR 1375.
CODE COMMISSION NOTES. --Since the purpose of Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, was to "revise, reorganize, modernize, consolidate, and clarify" laws relating to certain aspects of the motor vehicle code, wherever it was possible to do so, other Acts amending Title 40 were construed in conjunction with Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048. This construction particularly includes Acts amending a given Code section when the Code section was later renumbered or redesignated by Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048.
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND REGULATIONS. --Certificate of title applications, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Department of Driver Services, Chapter 375-2-12.
Scrapped vehicles, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division, Chapter 560-10-13.
LAW REVIEWS. --For article on choice-of-law of contracts in Georgia, see 21 Mercer L. Rev. 389 (1970). For article surveying Georgia cases dealing with commercial law from June 1977 through May 1978, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 15 (1978). For article surveying recent legislative and judicial developments regarding Georgia's insurance laws, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 117 (1979).
For note discussing the "Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act" and its impact, see 13 Mercer L. Rev. 258 (1961).
For comment on Maley v. National Acceptance Co., 250 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Ga. 1966), see 3 Ga. St. B.J. 248 (1966).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
COMMERCIAL LAW AND MOTOR VEHICLE PROVISIONS CONSTRUED IN PARI MATERIA. --Georgia Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act (see O.C.G.A. § 40-3-1 et seq.) and the Uniform Commercial Code (see O.C.G.A. T. 11) were adopted at the same session of the General Assembly, relate in part to the same subject matter, and must be construed in pari materia. GMAC v. Whisnant, 387 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1968).
PURPOSE OF CHAPTER. --Manifest purpose of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act (see O.C.G.A. § 40-3-1 et seq.) is to provide a comprehensive system, with few specific exceptions, for the central recordation of ownership, security interests, and liens in all motor vehicles registered and regularly in use in this state. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Smithloff, 119 Ga. App. 284, 167 S.E.2d 190 (1969).
Two of the more important purposes of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act (see O.C.G.A. § 40-3-1 et seq.) are: (1) to prevent traffic in stolen cars by providing an exclusive means of transfer which is recorded in a central location and can be verified quickly and easily; and (2) to provide a means for purchasers of automobiles to ascertain the entire interest of the seller by referring to the face of a single instrument. Flatau v. Bank of Banks County (In re Stewart), 9 Bankr. 32 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1980).
STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF CHAPTER. --Georgia Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act (see O.C.G.A. § 40-3-1 et seq.) must be strictly construed and enforced, especially in those instances where third party interests are involved. Flatau v. Bank of Banks County (In re Stewart), 9 Bankr. 32 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1980).
EFFECT ON EXISTING CASE LAW ON PROVING CHATTEL OWNERSHIP. --Georgia Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act (see O.C.G.A. § 40-3-1 et seq.) provided a simple statutory method of proving the ownership to motor vehicles, but it was not exclusive. It did not change the existing case law as to the manner in which ownership of chattels, including automobiles, could be proven. Hightower v. Berlin, 129 Ga. App. 246, 199 S.E.2d 335 (1973); Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Jenkins, 173 Ga. App. 775, 328 S.E.2d 399 (1985); GECC v. Catalina Homes, Inc., 178 Ga. App. 319, 342 S.E.2d 734 (1986).
APPLICABILITY OF GENERAL RULE ON PERSONAL PROPERTY. --With respect to automobiles not covered by the Georgia Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act (see O.C.G.A. § 40-3-1 et seq.), the rule applicable to personal property in general, that possession thereof constituted presumptive evidence of ownership, was applicable to automobiles. Wreyford v. Peoples Loan & Fin. Corp., 111 Ga. App. 221, 141 S.E.2d 216 (1965).
PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS. --Even though the provisions of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act (see O.C.G.A. § 40-3-1 et seq.) may be mandatory in some situations, transactions between the parties themselves are excepted from those provisions. Goger v. King, 17 Bankr. 64 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
PERFECTING OF SECURITY INTEREST IN VEHICLES. --Only way to perfect a security in motor vehicles was by filing under the Georgia Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act (see O.C.G.A. § 40-3-1 et seq.). Staley v. Phelan Fin. Corp., 116 Ga. App. 1, 156 S.E.2d 201 (1967); but see In re Chappell, 224 Bankr. 507 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1998).
When bank financed purchase of car by car-leasing business, the correct avenue for perfecting of the bank's security interest in the car was through the procedure set forth in O.C.G.A. Ch. 3, T. 40 as opposed to filing of the bank's financial statement under procedures established by the U.C.C. United Carolina Bank v. Capital Auto. Co., 163 Ga. App. 796, 294 S.E.2d 661 (1982).
PURPOSE OF PERFECTING SECURITY INTEREST. --Perfection of security interests under the Georgia Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act (see O.C.G.A. § 40-3-1 et seq.) served purpose of giving notice to subsequent creditors. In re Firth, 363 F. Supp. 369 (M.D. Ga. 1973).
LIENHOLDER'S BURDEN IN IDENTIFYING PARTIES TO BE SERVED. --Registration requirements of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act (see O.C.G.A. § 40-3-1 et seq.) minimize lienholder's burden in identifying the necessary parties to be served. Imperial Body Works, Inc. v. Waters, 156 Ga. App. 887, 275 S.E.2d 822 (1981).
WHEN TITLE PASSES UPON CASH SALES AGREEMENT. --When an agreement is made to sell an automobile for cash, and on delivery of the automobile a check is given for the purchase price as between the vendor and the vendee, and in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, the title to the automobile does not pass until the check is presented to and paid by the bank in the usual course of business. Wreyford v. Peoples Loan & Fin. Corp., 111 Ga. App. 221, 141 S.E.2d 216 (1965).
CRITERIA FOR TREATING POSSESSOR AS OWNER. --Mere possession alone by one who is not shown on the face of the certificate of registration issued by the Revenue Commissioner to be the owner, and in the absence of a properly executed assignment and warranty of title, is not sufficient to authorize another dealing with the possessor to treat that person as the owner thereof. Wreyford v. Peoples Loan & Fin. Corp., 111 Ga. App. 221, 141 S.E.2d 216 (1965).
CITED in Guardian Disct. Co. v. Settles, 114 Ga. App. 418, 151 S.E.2d 530 (1966); Johnson v. Dempsey, 117 Ga. App. 722, 161 S.E.2d 889 (1968); Lawrence v. Harding, 225 Ga. 148, 166 S.E.2d 336 (1969); Central Chevrolet, Inc. v. Lawhorn, 120 Ga. App. 650, 171 S.E.2d 774 (1969); Freeman v. Ryder Truck Lines, 244 Ga. 80, 259 S.E.2d 36 (1979); Harris v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Smith), 10 Bankr. 883 (M.D. Ga. 1981).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BUSINESS TRUST. --Georgia law does not permit a certificate of title to be held in the name of a business trust. 1997 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 97-28.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
AM. JUR. 2D. --7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 29 et seq.
C.J.S. --60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 90 et seq.
ALR. --Civil rights and liabilities as affected by failure to comply with regulations as to registration of automobile or motorcycle, or licensing of operator, 61 ALR 1190; 78 ALR 1028; 87 ALR 1469; 111 ALR 1258; 163 ALR 1375.