Article 3. REVENUE BONDS  

CROSS REFERENCES. --Constitutional provisions, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. VI.
 
LAW REVIEWS. --For article discussing extraterritorial provision of utility services by municipality, see 12 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (1977).
 
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
 
COURTS BOUND BY CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION. --Under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. VIII, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. VI, Para. I), the grant of such broad powers to municipalities as are contained in the Revenue Bond Law (O.C.G.A. Art. 3, Ch. 82, T. 36) is authorized, and by that the courts are bound and have nothing to do with the reasonableness, wisdom, policy, or expediency of the law. Lipscomb v. Cumming, 211 Ga. 55, 84 S.E.2d 3 (1954).
 
ISSUANCE OF BONDS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. --When it appeared that revenue anticipation bonds were to be issued by a town for improvement of waterworks under the authority and in accordance with the method prescribed by Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. VIII, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. VI, Para. I), and the laws incorporated therein by reference thereto, the proposed issuance of the revenue anticipation bonds, the proceeding for validation, and the judgment of validation were not contrary to any provisions of the Constitution. Thigpen v. Town of Davisboro, 81 Ga. App. 610, 59 S.E.2d 522 (1950).
 
ACTS RESTRICTING RIGHTS GRANTED UNDER ARTICLE INOPERATIVE. --Since the Revenue Bond Law (O.C.G.A. Art. 3, Ch. 82, T. 36), adopted in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. VIII, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. VI, Para. I), is a part of the charter of every municipality, any acts of the General Assembly tending to restrict the power of a municipality to exercise rights granted thereunder are inoperative for this purpose. Carter v. State, 93 Ga. App. 12, 90 S.E.2d 672 (1955).
 
REVENUE BOND LAW (O.C.G.A. ART. 3, CH. 82, T. 36) SETS OUT GENERAL LAW by which counties, municipalities, and other political subdivisions may raise revenue for projects contemplated. Carter v. State, 93 Ga. App. 12, 90 S.E.2d 672 (1955).
 
REVENUE BOND LAW (O.C.G.A. ART. 3, CH. 82, T. 36) DOES NOT PURPORT TO BE GENERAL LAW EXHAUSTIVE of purposes for which revenue bonds or certificates may be issued and this is not violative of the Constitutional provision that laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the state, and no special law shall be enacted in any case for which provisions have been made by an existing general law (Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. VI, Para. I)). Sigman v. Brunswick Port Auth., 214 Ga. 332, 104 S.E.2d 467 (1958).
 
EFFECT OF CONTRADICTORY LOCAL LEGISLATION. --General Assembly intended that every municipality should have exactly the same power to do all of the acts authorized by the Revenue Bond Law of 1937 (O.C.G.A. Art. 3, Ch. 82, T. 36) as adopted by Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. VIII, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. VI, Para. I), and the constitutional provisions being a part of the charter of a municipality, it necessarily follows that it has the authority to proceed thereunder regardless of other and alternate, or even contradictory, plans which might have been contained in local legislation. Carter v. State, 93 Ga. App. 12, 90 S.E.2d 672 (1955).
 
ARTICLE IS PART OF MUNICIPAL CHARTER. --When the Revenue Bond Law (O.C.G.A. Art. 3, Ch. 82, T. 36) and the Constitution of 1945 were adopted, the provisions of each as to revenue bonds became a part of the charter of every municipality. Lipscomb v. Cumming, 211 Ga. 55, 84 S.E.2d 3 (1954); Carter v. State, 93 Ga. App. 12, 90 S.E.2d 672 (1955).
 
CERTIFICATES NOT DEBTS WITHIN CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. --Revenue anticipation bonds issued under the Revenue Bond Law (O.C.G.A. Art. 3, Ch. 82, T. 36) do not subject the political subdivision issuing the bonds to any pecuniary liability thereon and are, therefore, not debts against such political subdivision within the meaning of the constitutional provision limiting such indebtedness (Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. VII, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. VI, Para. I)). Fort Oglethorpe v. Catoosa County, 80 Ga. App. 188, 55 S.E.2d 753 (1949).
 
REVENUE BOND LAW (O.C.G.A. ART. 3, CH. 82, T. 36) IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE FOR SELF-LIQUIDATING PROJECTS and revenue bonds therein contemplated are not to be a charge against the general credit of the county or municipality. The liability is to be satisfied only from revenues produced by the undertaking and, under the specific terms of the statute, the political division will never be required to aid in its retirement with funds derived from any other source, and is in fact prohibited from doing so. Reed v. City of Smyrna, 201 Ga. 228, 39 S.E.2d 668 (1946).
 
ORIGIN OF FUNDS AS AFFECTING PUBLIC OR PRIVATE STATUS. --Fact that the funds proposed to be used are to be derived from the sale of revenue anticipation bonds does not deprive the funds of the character of "public funds," use of which for private purpose or enterprise is prohibited. Beazley v. De Kalb County, 210 Ga. 41, 77 S.E.2d 740 (1953).
 
CITED in Dade County v. State, 201 Ga. 241, 39 S.E.2d 473 (1946); Findley v. City of Vidalia, 78 Ga. App. 581, 51 S.E.2d 542 (1949); McLucas v. State Bridge Bldg. Auth., 210 Ga. 1, 77 S.E.2d 531 (1953); Messenheimer v. Windt, 211 Ga. 575, 87 S.E.2d 402 (1955); Carter v. State, 211 Ga. 824, 89 S.E.2d 175 (1955); Merritt v. State, 95 Ga. App. 612, 98 S.E.2d 242 (1957); Southern Airways Co. v. De Kalb County, 216 Ga. 358, 116 S.E.2d 602 (1960); Smith v. Hayes, 217 Ga. 94, 121 S.E.2d 113 (1961); Couch v. City of Villa Rica, 203 F. Supp. 897 (N.D. Ga. 1962); Mays v. State, 110 Ga. App. 881, 140 S.E.2d 223 (1965); Rich v. State, 237 Ga. 291, 227 S.E.2d 761 (1976); Krause v. City of Brunswick, 242 Ga. 659, 251 S.E.2d 239 (1978); Reed v. State, 265 Ga. 458, 458 S.E.2d 113 (1995).
 
PROVISIONS OF THE REVENUE BOND LAW (O.C.G.A. ART. 3, CH. 82, T. 36) DID NOT RENDER MEANINGLESS THE MANDATE OF FORMER CODE 1933, § 69-202 (SEE O.C.G.A. § 36-30-3), forbidding councils from binding their successors. The express statutory authority for a municipality to contract with the bondholders as to specified future utility rates did not extend to contracts with the wholesaler of electrical power. Johnson v. State, 107 Ga. App. 16, 128 S.E.2d 651 (1962).
 
COVENANTS AGAINST DISPOSING OF UNDERTAKING ENFORCEABLE. --Covenants against leasing or otherwise disposing of an undertaking, revenues of which were pledged in accordance with the contract between a governing authority and its bondholders under the Revenue Bond Law (O.C.G.A. Art. 3, Ch. 82, T. 36), constitute a contract between such governing body and each bondholder which was enforceable by the latter under the provisions of Ga. L. 1937, p. 761, § 6 ( see O.C.G.A. § 36-82-65). Hicks v. State, 99 Ga. App. 302, 108 S.E.2d 187 (1959).
   
 
CREATION OF WATER DISTRICT AND SYSTEM OUTSIDE CITY APPROVED. --Revenue Bond Law (O.C.G.A. Art. 3, Ch. 82, T. 36) defines a "municipality" (now "governmental body") to be any county, city, or town. It authorizes any such municipality to create a water district and to construct, operate, and maintain a water system which may be located wholly within or wholly without the municipality, or partially within and partially without the municipality. City of Trenton v. Dade County, 75 Ga. App. 326, 43 S.E.2d 432 (1947).
 
NO CAUSE OF ACTION TO ENJOIN CITY FROM FURNISHING WATER OUTSIDE CITY LIMITS. --Petition which seeks to enjoin city from constructing a water line and furnishing water to customers because the customers are located outside the corporate limits of the city fails to state a cause of action. Lipscomb v. Cumming, 211 Ga. 55, 84 S.E.2d 3 (1954).
 
BONDS ISSUED TO EXTEND EXISTING SYSTEM OF IMPROVEMENTS APPROVED. --Under the provisions of the Revenue Bond Law (O.C.G.A. Art. 3, Ch. 82, T. 36) and the constitutional sanction thereof (Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. VIII, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. VI, Para. I)), revenue anticipation bonds may be issued by a municipality to extend an existing system of municipal improvements by pledging the entire revenue of the whole system to the payment thereof, subject to the rights of holders of prior issues, without prorating the values of the existing and the new facilities, and pledging only the revenue of such new facilities according to their proportion to the total value. Carter v. State, 93 Ga. App. 12, 90 S.E.2d 672 (1955).
 
GOVERNMENT CENTER AND RETARDATION CENTER BONDS CONFIRMED AND VALIDATED. See Building Auth. v. State, 253 Ga. 242, 321 S.E.2d 97 (1984).
 
ISSUING CERTIFICATES FOR CONSTRUCTION OF WAREHOUSE NOT AUTHORIZED. --Under the restrictive provisions of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. VIII, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. VI, Para. I), that governmental subdivisions of the state shall issue revenue anticipation bonds only to provide funds for such facilities and undertakings as are "specifically authorized and enumerated" by Acts there referred to, a county is not authorized to issue such revenue bonds for the acquisition or construction and equipping of warehouses to be used in the conduct of a general storage warehouse business, which is ordinarily carried on by private enterprise. Such an undertaking is not properly included within the definition of the word "terminal" as used in the Revenue Bond Law (O.C.G.A. Art. 3, Ch. 82, T. 36), and not "specifically authorized and enumerated" therein. Beazley v. De Kalb County, 210 Ga. 41, 77 S.E.2d 740 (1953).
 
CONTRACT WITH ENGINEERING COMPANY NOT PAYABLE FROM GENERAL FUNDS. --Liability against a municipality arising out of and by virtue of any contract made by such municipality with an engineering company, entered into pursuant to the provisions of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. VIII, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. VI, Para. I), and the Revenue Bond Law (O.C.G.A. Art. 3, Ch. 82, T. 36), is not an indebtedness of the municipality which can be paid and satisfied out of the general tax fund or other general funds of the municipality. City of Royston v. Littrell Eng'r Co., 87 Ga. App. 903, 75 S.E.2d 678 (1953).
   
 
SUPERIOR RIGHTS NOT GAINED BY PRIOR PROCEEDING TO VALIDATE CERTIFICATES. --There is nothing contained in the Revenue Bond Law (O.C.G.A. Art. 3, Ch. 82, T. 36) which expressly or by necessary implication gives that municipality which institutes proceedings first for the validation of its bonds, and the confirmation of the security for the payment thereof, superior rights over another municipality which may file proceedings to validate and confirm the security for its bonds subsequently thereto; this is true although the two proposed districts may embrace the same area or portions of the same area. City of Trenton v. Dade County, 75 Ga. App. 326, 43 S.E.2d 432 (1947).
 
CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT VALIDATING REVENUE BONDS. --Judgment validating revenue bonds, unless excepted to within the time provided by law, is conclusive upon all questions made, or that might have been made, prior to the judgment of validation, including the constitutionality of the statute under which the proceedings are had. Dawson v. Hospital Auth., 212 Ga. 146, 91 S.E.2d 12 (1956).
 
DEFECT IN SERVICE WAIVED BY APPEARANCE. --When the mayor and counsel of a municipality appear, file an answer, and acknowledge service of a petition for validating revenue bonds, any defect in the service of the petition on the mayor and counsel is held to be waived by appearance and pleading. Dade County v. State, 75 Ga. App. 330, 43 S.E.2d 434 (1947).
 
WRITTEN NOTICE BY ATTORNEY ON SOLICITOR GENERAL (NOW DISTRICT ATTORNEY) SUFFICIENT. --When a municipality through the municipality's proper officers, under the Revenue Bond Law (O.C.G.A. Art. 3, Ch. 82, T. 36), employs an attorney to guide and direct the municipality generally and to prepare proceedings for the purpose of validating revenue bonds, and such attorney prepares the resolution of the municipality and serves written notice of the passage of the resolution on the solicitor general (now district attorney), such will be deemed sufficient notice to the solicitor general (now district attorney). Dade County v. State, 75 Ga. App. 330, 43 S.E.2d 434 (1947).
 
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
 
EMINENT DOMAIN BEYOND CORPORATE CITY LIMITS. --Georgia municipalities have power of eminent domain, even beyond corporate city limits, for public works financed by revenue bonds. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U81-1.
 
MUNICIPALITIES IN BUSINESS ONLY TO SERVE PUBLIC WELFARE. --In the absence of special circumstances, it is not within the constitutional power of a legislature to authorize a municipal corporation (county) to engage in a business which can be and ordinarily is carried on by private enterprise, merely for the purpose of obtaining an income or deriving a profit therefrom, but it should be allowed to go into business only on the theory that thereby the public welfare will be subserved. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-176.
 
COUNTY CANNOT MAKE DONATIONS TO WATER AND SEWERAGE AUTHORITY, but it can enter into contracts with such authority. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-225.
 
ATHLETIC FACILITIES APPROVED. --Under the Revenue Bond Law (O.C.G.A. Art. 3, Ch. 82, T. 36), the county board of education could erect athletic fields, grandstands, and stadiums with revenue bonds to be retired solely from the usage of the fields, grandstands, and stadiums. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 168.
 
AMBULANCE SERVICE. --County has no right, in absence of special or local legislation granting such right, to operate ambulance service. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-176.
 
WEIGHT OF ADVICE OF COUNTY ATTORNEY. --Before a county board of education should undertake to create a debt under the Revenue Bond Law (O.C.G.A. Art. 3, Ch. 82, T. 36), the county board of education should advise with the county attorney and be governed according to the county attorney's advice and instruction. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 168.